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ABSTRACT 
 
WILLIAM ERIC MAHONEY: 
Market Competition and Individual Security in the  
Chilean Pension System 
 
 (Under the direction of Dr. Oliver Dinius) 
  
 In 1981, Chile was the first country in the world to implement a privatized elderly 
social security system: the Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP). The system’s 
creators argued that the forces of market competition would improve pension amounts 
and that the AFP would promote nation-wide equality in the pension system—the former 
pension system was not one system, but a collection of pension systems that were highly 
stratified by class. In 2017, pension payouts have not met expectations, and the AFP is 
one of the most salient and contentious issues in Chilean politics. The overarching 
objective of this thesis is to add to the scholarly discussion of the ability of the AFP—and 
privatized systems more generally—to provide social protection to the elderly. This thesis 
tries to illuminate how market competitiveness in the AFP affects individuals in Chile, 
especially those of lower incomes. To that end, I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) to measure market concentration within the AFP at the regional level and the level 
of different income tax brackets. Market concentration can be measured empirically and 
used to assess the level of market competitiveness, which is a normative judgement. I 
argue that competition in the AFP is most vigorous in wealthy regions and for wealthy 
Chileans. I further argue that both high competition and low competition are self-
reinforcing. As a result of these findings, I make the policy recommendations of 
improving financial literacy & knowledge of the pension system and of expanding 
licitación, the auction mechanism in which AFPs bid for new affiliates by offering the 
lowest commissions, to improve competition. I conclude that the most important 
contribution of my thesis is that I show that the class segmentation of the old Chilean 
pension system, which the AFP supposedly eliminated, is still present. 
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PROLOGUE 
In the United States, I am guilty, and our society is, of ignorance of the poor. 
When I am home in Denver and walk in certain parts of downtown, I occasionally cross 
paths with a homeless person. The reality is that it is easier to avoid eye-contact and walk 
by. Oxford and Lafayette county, Mississippi, are particularly notable for their 
inequalities. I attend university on scholarship and the largesse of my parents, yet many 
of the people who make the university and the town function—the janitors, gardeners, 
food-service workers, and others—make low wages and must commute from outside the 
county because the cost of living here is too high. However, it takes some deliberate 
contemplation to recognize this disparity. I am not as aware of my good fortune, nor 
aware of the tribulations of others, quite like I was while living in Chile.  
During past trips to Mexico and Guatemala, I witnessed extreme poverty, but 
those brief stays were not the same as living in a highly unequal society for a sustained 
period. Living in Chile made me confront the fact that there are many people who are less 
fortunate than me. In Valparaíso, men and children in ragged clothes would precariously 
hop on-and-off the darting busses to sell individual bandages or candy bars at $50 
Chilean pesos (about 8¢). Elderly women who appeared to be in their seventies or 
eighties would sit in the street and knit a few woolen caps a day to sell for $2000 pesos 
each. The Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso, where I studied, was in an 
especially poor part of the city. Homeless men and women would sleep and drink beer in 
a camp underneath the highway by the University, and farmers used donkeys to ferry 
fruit and vegetables to the market next door. Valparaíso is famous for its large hills that 
jut against the Pacific coast. Because of the arduousness of climbing the steep hills, the 
higher up you went on them, the cheaper the land and the poorer the inhabitants. Just one 
hill over from where I lived, people lived in shacks made from tarps and refuse wood. 
Their floors were dirt, trash was littered all around them, and feral dogs roamed the area.  
My home in Chile was a duplex in a lower-middle class neighborhood that shared 
a wall with an auto repair shop. I lived with a host mother who did not work—she 
derived her income from the money I paid for room & board and remittances from family 
members. Despite her modest income, she had a maid come twice a week on Mondays 
and Thursdays. The most personal example of income inequality was the inequality 
between those of us living in the house and our maid. Our maid was a middle-aged, 
portly woman who loved to sing while she worked. She would arrive mid-morning, 
sometimes late, and begin preparing the day’s almuerzo. The rest of her day consisted of 
sweeping and mopping the floors, scrubbing the kitchen, washing the dishes (which 
would be left piled up for her from previous days), cleaning the bathrooms, making up 
the bedrooms, doing the laundry, feeding the dog, watering the garden, and picking up 
the destruction caused by the grandchildren who would visit every other weekend.  
	 vii 
Our house was not large, but a list of chores like that is enough to make it seem 
large, and it took the nana all day to do her job. For all her labor, she was compensated 
with $10,000 pesos (about $15 at the time) and included in our lunch, although she was 
expected to serve us and was not permitted to indulge in a beer or a glass of wine as we 
did. I knew that our nana spent about $1000 pesos on bus-fare alone to get to and from 
our house, meaning that she netted $9,000 pesos. I don’t know if she had any other 
incidental expenditures associated with work. I do know her husband did not work, and 
that her daughter and granddaughter lived with her, with only the addition of her son’s 
income to provide for the whole family.  
The inequality between my nana and I became more apparent as I got to know 
her. A seemingly banal example of inequality was the box of mixed nuts that I bought 
from a supermarket and brought home one day. She scoffed at my purchase and told me 
that I could have bought much more for much less at the market by the university. 
Another example of inequality was the trip I took on a long weekend to Pucón, a resort 
town in south central Chile that is known as the adventure sport capitol of the country. 
My nana remarked to me that she had never been, but always wanted to go; the travel, 
accommodations, food, and activities were far too expensive for her. These interactions 
helped me to internalize the inequality I experienced in Chile. I thought of my home in 
Chile, and the homes on the hill over from mine, and wondered what my nana’s home 
looked like and what the quality of her family’s life was like. I realized that shopping in a 
supermarket could be a luxury. I was struck and embarrassed by the fact that I, a five-
month interloper in Chile, nonchalantly made plans to go somewhere in her own country 
that she had always wanted to visit, but never had the means to go. 
I assume that my nana will work well into old-age or until she no longer can. I 
hope the same for myself, but that it is out of zeal for my profession and not necessity. 
This is yet another luxury that I may have. I still wonder about my nana. What will she do 
when she can no longer work? How will she survive? Will her children have to divert 
resources from themselves—that could be used to better their lot in life—to her? I also 
wonder about the societal implications between the haves and the have-nots. What do 
those of us who are more fortunate owe those who are less fortunate? And, what should 
society do so that these disparities are lessened for current generations and not 
perpetuated for the next ones? 
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INTRODUCTION 
On February 17th, 2016, four days before I left for my semester in Chile, I got an 
email from my grandfather:  
Attached is a fascinating article because it deals with Chile’s ‘reformed’ social security system... 
Reforming Social Security has been one of my long-time issues of interest and the Cato Institute 
has been a leader in the area over the years. Hopefully, this will give you a subject which you can 
now discuss with your new Chilean hosts and friends!  
 
The article extolled the wonders of the privatized Chilean pension system—the 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (“Administrators of Pension Funds”, AFP) and 
was written by a man named José Piñera, the “father” of the system.1 The article 
postulated that a similar-style system might have been implemented in the United States 
during the Clinton Presidency, had the reform not been derailed by the Monica Lewinsky 
scandal. I knew that I would have to write a senior thesis, but I did not have a topic yet. 
The article’s praise of the Chilean pension system and its details of the possibility of a 
similar reform in the United States were interesting, so I made researching the AFP a part 
of my studies in Chile.  
The current Chilean pension system was created in 1981 under the dictatorial 
regime of Augusto Pinochet, and it is the oldest privatized pension system in the world—
it is administered by private corporations, not the Chilean state. All workers are obliged 
                                                
1 Piñera, José. President Clinton and the Chilean Model. Rep. 1st ed. Vol. XXXVIII. Washington D.C.: 
Cato Institute, 2016. Print. 
	 2 
to invest 10% of their income with a money-management company of their choice.2 
There are currently six companies that offer pension plans. With each company, workers 
can choose from five levels of risk (A-E) in which to have their income managed, known 
as multifondos, or “multifunds”. In theory, Chilean workers will make contributions for 
the entirety of their working lives, starting at a young age in an aggressive (A or B) level 
of risk. They will progress to the lowest level of risk as they approach retirement age, 65 
for men and 60 for women, ideally having amassed a sizeable balance of savings. They 
may then use this balance to purchase an annuity or receive their pension as a 
programmed withdrawal. 
Other countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe have 
copied the Chilean pension system, but judgement on the AFP by those who study it is 
mixed. Its supporters tout its macroeconomic success; the AFP has enjoyed an annual real 
rate of return of 8.6% since 1981.3 As of February 2017, AFP investments are worth 
$185.4 billion, equal to approximately 70% of Chile’s GDP, and, of that amount, $113 
billion (61% of funds) are invested in Chile.4 Nevertheless, the AFP’s detractors argue 
that while the returns from the AFP have been high, the payouts have been poor; the 
contributions made by workers have experienced high returns, but because their 
contribution amounts are low, they do not amass a sizeable pension. In fact, the average 
monthly pension of $315 is less than the monthly minimum wage salary of $384. The 
                                                
2 In addition to the 10% tax on wages, the companies receive commissions, as of now 0.41% to 1.54% of 
monthly income—depending on the AFP—for a total of 10.41% to 11.54% of worker income going to the 
pension system. 
3 Mesa Lago, Carmelo, and Fabio Bertranou. “Pension Reforms in Chile and Social Security Principles, 
1981-2015.” International Social Security Review 69.1 (2016): 25-45. Web 
4 Inversiones y rentabilidad de los fondos de pensiones febrero de 2017. Rep. Santiago: Superintendencia 
de Pensiones. Print. 
	 3 
national frustration with low pensions erupted on August 21st, 2016, when hundreds of 
thousands of people protested across the country after it was revealed that the ex-wife of 
a Socialist Party leader was receiving a monthly pension of $7,800.5 Clearly, I selected a 
contentious topic. The difficulty in writing a thesis about the AFP would lie not in finding 
an aspect of it to write about, but in selecting just one.  
Research Objectives 
 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to add to the scholarly discussion of the 
ability of the AFP—and privatized systems more generally—to provide social protection 
to the elderly. This thesis tries to illuminate how market competitiveness in the AFP 
affects individuals in Chile, especially those of lower incomes, such as my nana in 
Valparaíso. To that end, I measure market concentration within the AFP at the regional 
level and the level of different income tax brackets. Market concentration can be 
measured empirically and used to assess the level of market competitiveness, which is a 
normative judgement.   
At the turn of the 20th century, ensuring care for the elderly was largely left to the 
family unit. At that time, states began to take more active roles in the provision of elderly 
social security. The rationale that the state should provide some form of elderly social 
security is that workers deserve a basic level of income-security, independent of their 
success in the labor market and their family status. From another perspective, it is not in 
the interest of society to have a class of indigent elderly people. Before the AFP, there 
were no national-level, privatized, elderly social security systems. Basic elderly social 
                                                
5 Bonnefoy, Pascale. “With Pensions Like This ($315 a Month), Chileans Wonder How They’ll Ever 
Retire.” The New York Times, 10 Sept. 2016. Web. 15 Oct. 2016. 
	 4 
security for all was deemed too difficult and too important to leave to the market alone. 
The AFP was pioneering in that it was the first example of a state devolving its role in the 
provision of elderly social security to private corporations and individuals. Chile’s 
economic leaders justified the creation of the AFP under the assertion that a competitive 
free market for elderly social security would result in more efficient spending and 
promote greater individual choice than a government-run system. Workers would be able 
to get a larger pension for lower contributions. 
The assertion that an elderly social security system based on a competitive free 
market is superior to a government-run system is rooted in the principle in classical 
economics that maximum total utility is best achieved in a competitive free market. The 
spirit of such a market is dynamic. In a competitive free market, firms must innovate to 
keep their market share. Firms that maintain the status quo will be supplanted by other 
firms with a comparative advantage. In contrast, an uncompetitive market, such as a 
monopoly or an oligopoly, lacks innovation. In a market with only one firm or few firms, 
there is less pressure for a firm to improve because individuals lack other options. 
Maximum total utility is not achieved, compared to the competitive market. 
As I was exploring the database of the Superintendencia de Administradoras de 
Fondos de Pensiones (“Superintendence of Administrators of Pension Funds”, SAFP, the 
government agency that oversees the AFP), however, it seemed to me that the AFP 
market was not as competitive as it was hoped it would be. At the national level, the six 
AFPs vary significantly in terms of their market share of customers and the amount of 
money they manage. For example, as of December 2016, the largest AFP by share of 
customers, AFP Provida, has a market share of 29.7% of the contributors to the system, 
	 5 
while the smallest AFP by share of contributors, AFP Cuprum, has a market share of 
8.1%.6 This seemed at odds with the fact that AFP Cuprum administers 20.2% of the 
funds in the system and that AFP Provida administers 25.9% of the funds in the system.7 
Therefore, Cuprum had a smaller, but wealthier clientele, and Provida has a larger, but 
poorer clientele. Further examination of the data revealed that at a regional level, the 
market shares of the companies differed significantly from their national totals. It 
appeared that there was more competition between companies for customers in some 
northern regions, while there was less competition between companies for customers in 
other regions. I also looked at the market shares of the companies based on different 
income tax brackets. It appeared that there was more competition between companies for 
rich customers and less competition between companies for poor customers. These facts 
were not evident in news articles and blog posts about the AFP, nor academic 
assessments of it. It is only by downloading and poring over spreadsheets that I noticed 
them. 
Since the law mandates that all citizens be treated equally by the AFPs, I 
wondered, what are the implications of the variances in the level of market competition in 
different regions and in different income tax brackets? There are logical questions that 
one might ask, such as: Are workers in rich regions treated the same as workers in poor 
ones? Are workers in low income tax brackets treated the same as those in high income 
tax brackets? And, how does competition in the AFP affect current and future retirees?  
                                                
6 Número de cotizantes por region y AFP [Number of Contributors by Region and AFP]. 
Rep. Superintendencia de Pensiones, 2017. Centro de Estadísticas de la Superintendencia de Pensiones. 
Web. December 2016 is the most recent date for data on customer market share. The next release of data 
will happen in May 2017 and will be data concerning March 2017. 
7 Inversiones y rentabilidad de los fondos de pensiones febrero de 2017. Superintendencia de Pensiones. 
	 6 
Outline of Thesis 
 Chapter I provides the reader with the basis to understand my analysis in Chapter 
III. It begins with an introduction to the level of development and political and physical 
geography of Chile. Chile’s geography helps to explain its differences in regional wealth 
and regional population distribution, which are factors that will affect the regional market 
competitiveness of the AFP. Next, I detail some of the theory, history, and analysis used 
by scholars who study pension systems. This context is the foundation for the subsequent 
explanation of the historical structure and current structure of the Chilean pension 
system. The reader will come away from Chapter I prepared for the discussion of my 
methodology and more specific aspects of the AFP in Chapter II, as well as prepared for 
my analysis in Chapter III. 
 Chapter II discusses my methodology and reviews pertinent scholarly literature. 
It is important to define how I will assess market competitiveness. The standard I will use 
is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is a measure of market concentration 
developed independently by the economists Orris Herfindahl and Albert Hirschman that 
is used by antitrust regulators such as the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
the office of the Chilean Fiscalía Nacional Económica (“National Economic Prosecutor”, 
FNE) to make judgements on market competitiveness. Chapter II then reviews scholarly 
literature on the market competitiveness of the AFP and on regional development in 
Chile.  
Chapter III contains my original work. It uses data from the SAFP’s Trimestral 
Statistical Report of Affiliates and Contributors (“Informe Estadístico Trimestral de 
Afiliados y Cotizantes”) to measure market concentration within the AFP at the regional 
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level and the level of different income tax brackets. I argue that competition in the AFP is 
most vigorous in wealthy regions and for wealthy Chileans. I further argue that both high 
competition and low competition are self-reinforcing.  
Chapter IV discusses the implications of my analysis in Chapter III. It begins 
with the economic concepts of efficiency and equity. Economists prioritized efficiency 
when they created the AFP, at the expense of equity, although the AFP is still inefficient. 
Second, Chapter IV specifically considers what the effects of the differentials in market 
competitiveness in the AFP are for all Chileans, with most attention given to the case of 
the poorest Chileans. Using these considerations, Chapter IV makes the policy 
recommendations of improving financial literacy and knowledge of the pension system— 
especially that of the poorest Chileans—and of expanding licitación (“licitation”), the 
auction mechanism in which AFPs bid for new affiliates by offering the lowest 
commissions, to improve competition. Third, Chapter IV suggests that additional 
research could investigate the statistical significance of my findings and examine the 
qualitative side of these data. Finally, Chapter IV concludes that the most important 
contribution of my thesis is that I show that the class segmentation of the old Chilean 
pension system, which the AFP supposedly eliminated, is still present. 
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CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 I begin with an introduction to Chile for an additional reason: my experience 
suggests that some readers are unfamiliar with Chile. Because of its high level of 
development, relative political stability, and relatively small population, Chile is 
neglected in the United States’ consciousness, especially compared to other Latin 
American countries.  
Chile — Development and Geography  
Chile is the wealthiest country in Latin America on a per-capita basis, with a GDP 
per-capita of $13,383 and a median per-capita yearly income of $5,330,8 and has the 
highest Human Development Index (HDI, the United Nations’ measure for overall 
quality of life) in Latin America of 0.85. This ranks Chile among the countries with “very 
high human development” and a higher human development than Saudi Arabia, Portugal, 
and Russia. Yet, one-third of Chile’s economy is underground, and Chile has one of the 
highest Gini indexes (a measure of income inequality) in the world of 50.45. 
Geographically, Chile is a long but narrow country. It is approximately 2,700 miles in 
length but only 217 miles wide at its widest point. Chile spans 39º of latitude, more than 
the difference in latitude between Miami and Anchorage, and thus Chile has at least ten 
major climactic subtypes. Far northern Chile is home to the world’s most Arid desert, the 
Atacama. The northern regions are the epicenter of Chile’s copper wealth, (copper 
                                                
8 “World Development Indicators: Chile.” The World Bank, 10 Aug. 2016. Web. 19 Sept. 2016. 
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accounts for 20% of GDP), and the four northernmost regions contain 8.4% of Chile’s 
population. The wealth of the copper industry is what makes this relatively high amount 
of population sustainable in such an inhospitable place. Central Chile is fertile land that is 
home to Chile’s agricultural production. Santiago, located in the center of the country, 
dominates Chile politically, socially, and economically. The Santiago Metropolitan 
Region (RM) itself accounts for 40% of Chile’s population, and when combined with the 
V and VI regions, the Santiago exurban area accounts for 55% of population. Finally, the 
far south of Chile is known for its rugged Patagonian landscape. The two southernmost 
regions benefit economically from hydrocarbon extraction, as well as timber resources, 
aquaculture, livestock, and tourism. Regions XI and XII contain 1.5% of Chile’s 
population. While in percentage terms, Regions XI and XII do not contribute much to 
national GDP (less than 2%), they have comparatively higher GDP per capita than other 
regions because their absolute GDP are high, relative to their small populations.  
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Image 1: The Regions of Chile9 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
9 Regions of Chile. Digital image. Wikipedia. Web. 25 Feb. 2017. 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions_of_Chile>. 
	 11 
Image 2: Population Distribution of Chile10  
Image 3: Regional GDP Per Capita11  
                                                
10 Population Distribution of Chile. Digital image. Wikipedia. Web. 25 Feb. 2017. 
<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b7/Cl-cities.png>. 
11 OECD (2016), OECD Regions at a Glance 2016, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/reg_glance-2016-en>. p. 64. Constant 2010 USD PPP in thousands 
	 12 
 
The Theory of Pension Systems 
In the United Nations’ International Labor Organization (ILO) Social Security 
Minimum Standards Convention, the ILO defines “social security systems” as a series of 
programs that protect citizens from “the insecurities related to making a living through 
work”. According to the ILO, there are “nine principal branches of social security”. 
These branches are benefits for: medical care, sickness, unemployment, old age, 
employment injury, family, maternity, invalidity and survivors.12 The size and scope of a 
social security system is a response to questions such as: What should social security 
entail? Should it be available to all? To what degree should eligibility be tied to work 
and payment history? These questions are contentious, and different ideologies have 
different responses to them. Because the AFP is designed primarily to cover the old age 
portion of social security,13 going forward, I shall use variations of the terms “pension 
system” and “pension prevision” when referring to the AFP and the subset of social 
security that protects the elderly.14 
The first national pension systems were founded at the turn of the 20th century and 
took on two different models. One model was the German contributory insurance 
model.15 In 1891, a pension insurance system was included in Bismarck’s introduction of 
                                                
12 “International Labour Standards on Social Security.” International Labour Organization.  
Web. 11 Mar. 2017. <http://ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-
standards/social-security/lang--en/index.htm>. The 1952 Convention is “the flagship of all ILO social 
security Conventions, as it is the only international instrument, based on basic social security principles, 
that establishes worldwide-agreed minimum standards for all nine branches of social security”.  
13 Although it encompasses other portions, such as invalidity and survivors’ benefits 
14 Mirroring the Spanish term for old-age social security: previsión. While the AFP’s coverage mandate is 
similar, the system is significantly different from the United States government program Social Security. 
(The US program is also much narrower in focus than the ILO definition of its name would suggest.) 
15 Baily, Martin Neil, and Jacob Funk Kirkegaard. US Pension Reform: Lessons from Other Countries. 
Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009. Print. p.110 
	 13 
social welfare measures designed to promote the cohesion of states that made up the 
newly formed German Empire. The system was funded by workers, employers, and the 
government, and was strictly a defined contribution (DC) system, meaning that 
pensioners received benefits that were directly proportional to what they paid into the 
system. The other model was the British “universal means-tested model”.16 In 1908 in 
Britain, the Old Age Pension Act granted a universal, old-age, flat-rate pension that was 
paid out of the general funds of the Treasury (known as a defined benefit (DB) system). 
The system had no contribution requirements, which made it highly redistributive, 
although the law was constructed in a way that made it easy to exclude beneficiaries.17 
Today, national pension systems follow the precedence of the German and British 
models. Of the countries in the OECD, the most redistributive national pension systems 
in order are New Zealand, Ireland, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia.18 The 
United States’ pension system is also relatively redistributive, in 11th place, but it is the 
least redistributive of the Anglophone countries and relies more than 80% on defined 
contributions. Meanwhile, the modern German pension system is less redistributive than 
the OECD average and relies more than 80% on defined contributions as well. As an 
observation, less redistributive pension systems tend to have more generous benefits, are 
easier to fund, and tend to be more popular with countries’ citizens, but they provide less 
support to the poor. More redistributive pension systems tend to be low in benefits paid 
out, are harder to fund, and have varying degrees of popularity, but they provide more 
                                                
16 ibid. p. 109 
17 Elderly persons who met the means test could be denied a pension if the administrators determined that 
they had not worked “up to their potential”.  
18 Baily and Kirkegaard, p. 109-110 
	 14 
support to the poor. Table 1 includes some of the broad criteria that may be used to 
classify pension systems. These criteria are not binary, and pension systems are often 
hybrids to some degree of each criterion. 
Table 1: Pension System Classification 
Pension System Classification19 
Criterion: Classification: 
Stipulated 
Obligations 
Defined Benefit (DB): No contribution level is stipulated. 
Benefits are automatic, although they may be means-tested. 
Defined Contribution (DC): Workers must contribute a 
certain amount or percentage of income. Benefits are a function 
of contributions. 
Type of 
Administration 
Public: The pension is administered by institutions pertaining 
to the state. 
Private: The pension is administered by for-profit or non-
profit, private entities. The state only acts in a regulatory 
capacity. 
Method of 
Financing 
Transfer Payments: Current workers subsidize current 
retirees. The pension is viewed as an intergenerational 
obligation. Also known as “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO). 
Capitalization: The pensioner finances their own pension. The 
pension may be invested, and the investment may be done so 
individually or collectively. 
Participation 
Mandate 
Obligatory: Workers are obligated to affiliate with the pension 
system and make contributions. 
Voluntary: Individuals affiliate with the pension system and 
contribute on their own accord. 
 
  
                                                
19 Original work, but inspired by: Rubilar Maturana, Claudina, and César Venegas Piñeda. “El desempeño 
de los fondos de pensiones a través de la rentabilidad, eficiencia y comportamiento de mercado de las 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones en Chile, para el periodo 2006-2011: Un enfoque económico-
financiero.” Thesis. Pontificia Universidad Católica De Valparaíso, 2012. Print. p. 12; and Mesa-Lago, 
Carmelo. “Structural Reform of Social Security Pensions in Latin America: Models, Characteristics, 
Results and Conclusions.” International Social Security Review 54.4 (2001): 67-92. Print.  
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The Chilean Pension System – Historical Structure 
 In 1924, Chile was the first country in the Western Hemisphere to establish a 
national pension system for the elderly, widows, and the disabled.20 The original Chilean 
pension system lacked uniformity, with different regimes for different segments of the 
population. At its foundation, there were three regimes, one each for manual laborers, 
salaried workers, and public employees.21 Through accommodations and dispensations 
by the government to special interest groups, by the late 1970s it comprised thirty major 
regimes and as many as one-hundred fifty parallel and sub-regimes based on occupation, 
education level, risks associated with employment, and other factors. These stratified 
pension regimes were administered by more than 600 different entities.22 In 1979, 
contributors were allocated 94% into the three original regimes. Meanwhile, the thirteen 
smallest regimes had less than 1000 members in each.23 
 Edwards writes “the original system was not, as it has often been argued, a pure 
pay-as-you-go-one” but a system based on the collective capitalization of funds.24 
However, by the 1970s, the system relied on the government to fund its obligations and 
was essentially an insolvent PAYGO system. Government patronage went 
disproportionately to societal elites. Each pension regime had different contribution 
requirements, benefit levels, retirement ages, indexation methods, and administrative 
bodies. Some government workers could retire as early as 42, while workers in the major 
                                                
20 Kritzer, Barbara E. “Privatizing Social Security: The Chilean Experience.” Social Security Bulletin 1996: 
45-55. Division of Program Analysis, Office of Research, Evaluation and Statistics, Social Security 
Administration. Web. p. 45 
21 “Previsión social.” Memoria Chilena. Biblioteca Nacional De Chile, 2016. Web. 
<http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-93766.html>. 
22 Arenas De Mesa, Alberto. Cobertura previsional en Chile: Lecciones y desafíos del sistema de pensiones 
administrado por el sector privado. Rep. no. 105. Santiago: United Nations, 2000. Print. p. 12 
23 Kritzer, p. 45 
24 Edwards, Sebastian. “The Chilean Pension Reform: A Pioneering Program.” Privatizing Social Security. 
Ed. Martin S. Feldstein. U of Chicago, 1998. 33-62. Print., p. 37 
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manual labor regime had to retire at 65. The most egregious example of the corruption of 
the original pension system is the case of the Chilean equestrian sports industry, as 
outlined by Piñera. For the eight polo and horse racing clubs in Chile, there were two 
pension regimes—one for breeders, trainers, and jockeys, and one for the employees of 
the clubs themselves—and in each regime a worker could retire after ten years of service. 
Not surprisingly, the clubs enrolled far more people in their pension regimes than they 
employed. On paper, Chile had the highest ratio of horse trainers to racehorses in the 
world.25 
The critical issue of the old system was not just the high benefits promised. Lack 
of contributions also harmed the financial state of the old pension system. While 
contribution obligations ranged from 16-26% of wages for the various regimes, and in 
1980 the average contribution obligation was 19%,26 few workers actually contributed. 
The high contribution rates encouraged workers and employers to evade official 
employment or employment altogether. In addition, it was easy to game the system. 
Workers were guaranteed a basic pension, so they did not need to contribute at all. 
Conversely, workers could under-report their earnings until their last five years of 
employment, as those were the only years that were used to calculate benefits, thereby 
minimizing their contributions while maximizing their benefits.27 
 The structural problems of the former Chilean pension system were exacerbated 
by the (complicated) economic crisis following the election of Salvador Allende in 1970. 
With triple normal unemployment and hyperinflation of the peso, the government 
                                                
25 Piñera, José. El cascabel al gato. Web. <http://www.josepinera.org/zrespaldo/el_cascabel_al_gato.pdf>. 
 p. 11 
26 Edwards, p. 38 
27 Kriter, p. 46
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lowered the percentage of wages for contribution obligations to try and encourage 
employment and indexed pensions below inflation to try and decrease benefits. Still, 
because of unemployment, informal employment, and evasion, the ratio of contributors to 
workers declined from 12:1 in 1955 to 2:1 during the tumultuous 1970s. In 1968, 18.1% 
of GDP was spent by the private and public sector on pensions28, and in 1971 liabilities 
exceeded 100% of Chile’s GDP.29 Following the 1973 golpe del estado, subsequent 
political and economic sanctions on Chile by the international community for human 
rights abuses and antidemocratic practices further strained the pension system. 
 The authoritarian government of Augusto Pinochet implemented what today are 
referred to as neoliberal reforms in late 1974 and early 1975. Chile can be considered the 
“laboratory” of neoliberal reform. These early neoliberal reforms included trade 
liberalization (the elimination of all import quotas and a uniform import tariff of 10%), 
the privatization of government-owned banks and other firms that were nationalized 
under the Allende government,30 the introduction of a national sales tax and the reduction 
of the tax code, the “drastic” reduction of regulations on the banking and financial 
sectors, and the introduction of a two-tiered insurance-based healthcare system—
repealing the socialized one.31 At the beginning of 1980, Chile’s economic leaders turned 
their sights on the pension system. Then Minister of Labor José Piñera persuaded General 
Pinochet that the old pension system was an albatross on the neck of Chile and began 
                                                
28 Piñera, El cascabel al gato, p. 2 
29 Edwards, p. 38 
30 A more robust round of privatization would not begin until 1984 that resulted in the privatization of 96% 
of state-owned enterprises, including the national airline, telephone company, and water and electric 
utilities. Notably, the copper industry (20% of GDP) remains largely state-owned. 
31 Edwards, p. 35; I list some of the neoliberal reforms undertaken because the extent of the reforms and the 
fact that they were about simultaneous has made it difficult to access the effects of any one reform. This 
includes the AFP. 
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drafting a reform. On May 1st, 1980––International Labor Day—the Ministry of Labor 
announced that the government would replace the old pension system with one based on 
individual capitalization. The overhaul was delayed, however, with the announcement on 
August 11th of a plebiscite on the constitution of 1980 and Pinochet as president, set for 
September 11th. After the Sí vote of the plebiscite, negotiations of the pension reform 
resumed. On November 4th, 1980, the military government issued decrees 3,500 and 
3,501, creating the AFP and setting Labor Day 1981 for the new system’s 
implementation. Special interests, including the military, opposed the termination of the 
old pension regime. The Ministry of Labor promised that the AFP would promote 
equality by doing away with the dispensations to select groups and unifying all Chileans 
under the same pension regime. Nevertheless, the final draft of the law that went into 
effect on May 1, 1981 had a caveat: the military would be excluded from the new reform 
and free to maintain their old, generous regime. Chilean workers who had already paid 
into an old pension regime were given the option to stay with their pension regime or 
enroll in the new system, but all new workers would only have the option to participate in 
the AFP. 
The Chilean Pension System – Modern Structure 
Once again, the AFP has enjoyed an annual real rate of return of 8.6% since its 
inception, and as of February 2017, AFP investments are worth $185.4 billion—equal to 
approximately 70% of Chile’s GDP. Despite this overall high return, the pension payouts 
have been poor because worker contribution amounts are too low to amass a sizeable 
pension. The International Labor Organization sets the minimum pension replacement 
rate (the percentage of a worker’s pre-retirement income that their pension covers), for an 
	 19 
average earner with 30 years of contributions at 45%.32 Meaning that at a minimum, a 
pension should equal 45% of the pensioner’s pre-retirement income. The Private Pension 
Unit of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) pins an 
ideal minimum replacement rate of 60%. However, the AFP’s mean replacement rate for 
a person at the median annual income is 37.7% of earnings for a male and 33.1% of 
earnings for a female.33 The disparity in the average pensions between men and women is 
also more acute than the means alone indicate because Chilean women earn 67% of the 
lifetime earnings of men. The AFP does not, therefore, provide the minimum standard of 
living for the average Chilean as outlined by the United Nations ILO or the OECD.  
Table 2 returns to the previous criteria to categorize the AFP. It is primarily a 
defined contribution system because benefits are heavily tied to contributions. There is, 
however, a modest, two-tier defined benefits “solidarity pillar”. The lower tier is the 
Pensión Básica Solidaria (“Basic Solidarity Pension”, PBS), which is a benefit granted to 
Chilean pensioners in the bottom six income deciles who do not have any savings with an 
AFP. The second tier is the Aporte Previsional Solidario (“Previsional Solidarity 
Contribution”, APS), which is a government “top-up” for pensioners who have a minimal 
pension with their AFP.34 The AFP is considered a privatized system because for-profit, 
private enterprises comprise most of its operation, such as the collection, management, 
and distribution of funds; the Chilean state acts as a regulatory agency and administers 
the solidarity pillar. The AFP is financed by individual capitalization. The frequency of 
                                                
32 “International Labour Standards on Social Security.” International Labour Organization.  
33 Pensions at a Glance 2015: OECD and G20 Indicators. Rep. Paris: OECD, 2015. Print. 
34 “Pensión Básica Solidaria de Vejez (PBS-Vejez).” Safp.cl. Superintendencia de Pensiones de Chile. 
Web. 05 Mar. 2017. <http://www.safp.cl/portal/orientacion/580/w3-article-5784.html>. The PBS is 
$102,897 CLP, or about $150, monthly. The government uses a formula to determine the APS for each 
pensioner, but it is available for pensioners whose pension is below $304,062 CLP, or about $450, monthly. 
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contributions, amount of contributions, risk preferences of workers, returns generated, 
and commissions paid by each worker to the AFP will affect the final pension amount. 
Lastly, participation in the AFP is obligatory. Theoretically, 100% of the Chilean labor 
force should be enrolled with an AFP—this is mandated by law.35 Nevertheless, the 
theoretical maximum contribution rate is not equal to the enrollment rate of 100% when 
the economy is operating at the natural rate of unemployment of 5%.36 When the Chilean 
economy is operating normally, under ideal conditions, one would expect 95% of the 
labor-force to be working and, therefore, a contribution rate of 95%.  
Table 2: Classification of the AFP 
Classification of the AFP 
Criterion: Classification: 
Stipulated 
Obligations 
Defined Contribution (DC): Workers must contribute 10% of 
income per month. There is a two-tier defined benefit “solidarity 
pillar”. 
Type of 
Administration 
Private: Currently six for-profit corporations collect and invest 
workers’ contributions. The SAFP regulates the industry. 
Method of 
Financing 
Capitalization: The pensioner finances his own pension 
through the investment of his contributions. The contributions 
are not pooled when they are invested. 
Participation 
Mandate 
Obligatory: Workers are obligated to affiliate with the pension 
system and make contributions. 
 
However, the observed contribution rate is 65% of the labor force.37 Individuals 
do not make AFP contributions for a variety of reasons: 1) They simply may be too poor 
to afford to contribute. 2) They may avoid contributions if they are employed in the 
informal economy. There will be no official record of their employment, and thus no 
record that they are violating the law. The requirement of AFP contributions and other 
                                                
35 Edwards, p. 41. He argues that this is the case. He pins labor-force enrollment in AFPs at “almost 99%” 
36 Ibid. 37. The natural rate of unemployment is the hypothetical unemployment rate when aggregate 
production is at its long-run equilibrium. 
37 Mesa-Lago and Bertranou, p. 28 
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forms of taxation and regulation disincentivize certain workers or their employers from 
becoming a part of the official labor force. 3) They are “gaming” the system. By making 
sporadic contributions, or under-reporting their earnings, they may be able to qualify for 
certain government benefits that they otherwise would not qualify for.38 4) They are self-
employed. At the outset of the system, self-employed workers were not obliged to 
affiliate, although they were encouraged to. Starting in 2012, self-employed workers had 
to affiliate and make contributions on the first 40% of their income, rising to 100% in 
2014.39 Therefore, the observed contribution rate in the years before 2014 will be much 
lower, as about one-third of the labor force was not required to affiliate or contribute. In 
the years after 2014, independent workers have been slow to adapt to the change in the 
law, with their participation rate hovering at 33% in 2015.40 
There have been three significant periods in terms of the level of concentration in 
the AFP. The initial period is 1981-1990, when the market was establishing itself. 
Because of the fragility of the Chilean economy at that time (there was a recession in 
1982), “it was not a propitious period for the development of this type of market”.41 
There were 12 AFPs from the inception of the system in 1981, through 1985. Five of 
those companies are among the six still operating today.42 The second phase was from 
1991-1996. Beginning in 1991, the government took additional measures to promote 
competition in the AFP market by deregulating the sales tactics permitted by AFPs 
(increasing the number of salespersons firms could contract, reducing restrictions on 
                                                
38 The Previsional Solidarity Contribution was created partially to address workers in the gray economy and 
those who would game the system. 
39 “Trabajadores Independientes.” Superintendencia De Pensiones. Web. 3 Mar. 2017. 
<http://www.safp.cl/portal/orientacion/580/w3-propertyvalue-9358.html>. 
40 Mesa-Lago and Bertranou, p. 28 
41 Vera, Marcela, and Alberto Mayol. "¿Es competitivo el mercado de las AFP’s?" (2015). Web. p. 2 
42 Those five companies are: Cuprum, Habitat, Planvital, Provida, and Capital. 
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marketing, and permitting companies to offer sign-up bonuses for enrolling with an 
AFP—money, clothes-irons, televisions, etc.). By 1993, the number of firms in the 
industry rose to 22. But, 1995 was the first year with a significant number of mergers. By 
1996, the number of firms diminished to 13. 
The final period is from 1997 to the present. While the earlier deregulatory 
measures did have a positive effect on the number of firms in the market, they did not 
result in reduced administrative costs and commissions. This is largely because, before 
2002, each AFP could only offer the C fund, and there were regulations for both lack of 
profitability and profitability. AFPs that posted returns below 50% of the average across 
all companies had to make up the difference from an investment reserve funded by the 
managers. AFPs that posted profits above 50% of the average across all companies had to 
invest the excess profits in the same reserve. The result of the imposition of one fund per 
company and the regulations on lack of profitability and over-profitability resulted in 
each AFP offering “extremely similar” portfolios.43 Thus, the only way companies 
differentiated themselves in practice was through aggressive marketing, sales tactics, and 
sign up bonuses. Commissions were high across the board, and they were not going 
towards market innovation or improving worker pensions. Therefore, in 1997, the SAFP 
retracted some of its deregulatory measures. The Superintendence banned companies 
from offering monetary incentives or gifts for enrolling in an AFP. It imposed a hiring 
freeze on all new sales people. It also constrained the number of times individuals could 
change AFPs to two times per year.44 From 1997 to 2007 the number of AFPs declined 
from 13 to 5. A new company, AFP Modelo, entered the market in 2010. No AFP that 
                                                
43 Edwards, p. 44 
44 Vera and Mayol, p. 3 
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was created in the 1990s survived alone in the market, and there are currently half of the 
companies operating than when the system was created. Image 4 illustrates the changes in 
the number of AFPs over time. 
Image 4: Evolution of the Number of AFPs 1982-201545 
 
Summary of Chapter I 
 The purpose of social security systems is to protect workers from “the insecurities 
related to making a living through work”. The justification for the subset of social 
security that is pension prevision is that elderly persons are owed some level of income to 
survive when they can no longer work, perhaps out of duty to our parents and 
grandparents, or, more selfishly, the reality that we will all be old one day. The historical 
Chilean pension system should be noted for its severe insolvency and segmentation. 
Multiple factors contributed to its insolvency, but overall it was due to the mismatch of 
low contributions with high payouts. The historical system was fundamentally segmented 
for different members of society; special interests had more generous pension regimes, 
while most Chileans did not. The AFP was instituted in part to address the solvency 
issues and to create a pension system that was structurally the same for all workers. 
                                                
45 Reproduced from Vera and Mayol, p. 2 
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CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Once again, I chose to analyze the aspect of market competitiveness in the AFP 
because of the variations in firm market share that were evident in the data from the 
Superintendence of the Administrators of Pension Funds. It is important then to explain 
how I will assess market competitiveness. I will use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), a measure of market concentration that the Chilean government itself uses to 
judge market competitiveness.  
Methodology: The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated by summing the squares of the 
individual market shares of all firms in an industry. Expressed as a number from 0–
10,000, or as a percent, the HHI reflects the overall concentration of a market. Since the 
HHI is composed from the square of the market shares of the firms, examination of it 
reveals that the HHI gives heavier weight to firms with large market share than those 
with small market share. This “corresponds to the theoretical notion in economics that 
the greater the concentration of output in a small number of firms (a high HHI), the 
greater the likelihood that, other things equal, competition in a market will be weak”.46 In 
contrast, competition in a market with a low HHI is more likely to be vigorous. The HHI 
has a maximum bound of 10,000 when one firm controls all market share, 100 # =
                                                
46 Rhoades, Stephen A. “The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.” Federal Reserve Bulletin Mar. 1993: 188-89. 
Web.; emphasis added 
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10,000. The HHI has a lower bound that is asymptotic at 0; as the number of firms in an 
industry approaches infinity, the HHI approaches 0.  
 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index has been the Department of Justice’s standard 
for measuring market concentration since 1985. The Chilean government subsequently 
copied the U.S. standards. Both the Department of Justice and the Fiscalía Nacional 
Económica employ the same levels of scrutiny: markets with an HHI below 1,500 are 
considered “unconcentrated”, markets with an HHI between 1,500 and 2,500 are 
considered “moderately concentrated”, and markets with an HHI above 2,500 are 
considered “highly concentrated”.47 Mergers and acquisitions that increase the HHI by 
100 points or more are also subject to scrutiny by the antitrust regulators. The 
Department of Justice remarks, however:  
The purpose of these thresholds is not to provide a rigid screen to separate competitively benign 
mergers from anticompetitive ones, although high levels of concentration do raise concerns. 
Rather, they provide one way to identify some mergers unlikely to raise competitive concerns and 
some others for which it is particularly important to examine whether other competitive factors 
confirm, reinforce, or counteract the potentially harmful effects of increased concentration.48 
 
Or, while these are normative standards, they are still beneficial. 
The following examples of calculating the HHI before and after a merger 
illustrate the use of this measure. Assume that there are four firms in a market. Firm A 
holds 40% of the market share, firm B holds 30% of the market share, firm C holds 20% 
of the market share, and firm D holds 10% of the market share. The sum of the squares of 
these values gives the HHI for the market:  40# +	30# +	20# +	10# = 𝟑, 𝟎𝟎𝟎	 
                                                
47 For the U.S. standards, see: United States. U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission. Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Washington D.C., 2015. Print.; For the (identical) Chilean 
standards, see Chile. Fiscalía Nacional Económica. La guía interna para el análisis de operaciones de 
concentración horizontal. By Felipe Irarrázabal. Santiago, 2012. Print. 
48 DOJ, §5.3 
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The HHI of this market is, therefore, 3000.  
Suppose that firm C acquires firm D. Their combined market share is 30%. The new 
market HHI is:  40# +	30# +	30# = 𝟑, 𝟒𝟎𝟎  
The merger, therefore, increased the HHI by 400 points.  
Finally, consider if instead, firm A acquires firm D. Their combined market share is 50%. 
In this scenario, the market HHI is: 50# +	30# +	20# = 𝟑, 𝟖𝟎𝟎  
This demonstrates the weight the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index gives to larger firms. 
Although both cases were a 10% shift in the industry market share, the second case 
resulted in a larger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  
When there are many firms in an industry, or when determining a firm’s market 
share is difficult, it can be challenging to use the HHI to measure market concentration. 
This challenge is not present in the case of the AFP. The number of firms is six. The 
SAFP also mandates trimestral disclosures of AFP data, so the exact market share of each 
firm can be calculated. An attribute of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is that any HHI is 
a “numbers equivalent”. 49 To obtain the HHI corresponding to a market with a given 
number of equal-sized firms, multiply the reciprocal of the number of firms by 10,000. 
This HHI is the minimum possible HHI for the market. For example, the HHI for a 
market of six equal-sized firms is:  612 ∗ 10,000 = 𝟏, 𝟔𝟔𝟕. 
                                                
49 Calkins, Stephen. “The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.” California Law 
Review 6th ser. 71.2 (1983): 402-29. Print. p. 404-406 
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Then, the theoretical HHI for a perfectly even distribution of market share in the AFP is 
1,667. Further, each firm would have a market share of 16.67%. The six-firm HHI can 
never go lower than this threshold. This is important when considering the FNE’s 
antitrust standards. If there are only six firms, by the FNE’s measures of market 
concentration, the AFP will be considered at least “moderately concentrated” no matter 
the distribution of market share. However, a strict adherence to the FNE’s guidelines will 
not be as useful for my analysis because the AFP is an inherently concentrated industry.  
As a final aide to understanding the HHI, Image 5 is a chart from the University of 
Santiago economist Marcela Vera and the sociologist Alberto Mayol’s 2015 paper “Is the 
AFP Market Competitive?”, showing the evolution of the number of AFPs and the HHI 
from 1982-2007. The blue line represents the number of AFPs. The maroon line 
represents the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Notice their inverse relationship. 
Image 5: Evolution of the Number of AFPs and the National HHI 1982-200750 
   
  
                                                
50 Reproduced from Vera and Mayol, p. 12 
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Scholarship on the Market Competitiveness of the AFP 
The AFP is significantly distorted from a normal market, which affects its level of 
competition. Dr. Salvador Valdés Prieto, a professor of economics at the Catholic 
University of Chile who received his Ph.D. in economics from MIT, examined the 
competitiveness of the AFP market in his 2005 paper “Alternatives to Increase the 
Competition Between the AFPs”. He cites the behavior of the demand function for the 
AFP market and economies of scale as factors that reduce the level of competitiveness. 
The demand function of consumers for an AFP is highly price inelastic. This comes 
fundamentally from the fact that “although the affiliates are obligated by the state to buy 
services from the AFPs, they are still free to not interest themselves with them.”51  
The first reason for an inelastic demand function that Valdés Prieto highlights is 
the systemic lack of financial literacy on the part of affiliates. He attributes this to the 
complexity of the AFP system. He underscores the fact that, in 2005, only 12% of AFP 
affiliates voluntarily purchased other mutual funds. The lack of financial literacy is even 
more starkly illustrated by the economist Alberto Arenas de Mesa (Minister of Finance 
from 2006-2010 and 2014-2015) in “The Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25: Lessons 
from the Social Protection Survey”. Arenas de Mesa analyzes the Encuesta de Previsión 
Social (EPS, “Social Provision Survey”) from 2002 and 2004, a longitudinal survey from 
a sample of “approximately 8.1 million current and former affiliates of the Chilean old-
age system… [containing] data on 17,246 individuals affiliated with the old or the new 
retirement system for at least 1 month at any time during 1981–2001.”52 Arenas de Mesa 
reports that only 28% of respondents knew the mandatory contribution rate (10% of 
                                                
51 Valdés Prieto, Salvador. "Para aumentar la competencia entre las AFP." Santiago. Estudios Públicos 98 
(2005): 87-142. Print. 
52 Arenas de Mesa 2000, p. 34 
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income), 10% knew how pension funds were invested, and “fewer than 2 percent of the 
respondents” knew the commission they paid to their AFP!53  
Other reasons that Valdés Prieto cites as contributing to the inelasticity of the 
demand function are: 2) The tendency for customers to stay with the first AFP they 
affiliate with—there is high inertia of customers. 3) The fragmentation of commissions. 
Commissions are paid monthly, as opposed to yearly, so there is a tendency to avoid 
comprehending the total annual commission paid. The annual differences in savings 
produced from switching from a high-commission AFP to a low-commission AFP are 
also less obvious. 4) For those with employers, AFP contributions and commissions are 
deducted automatically from their paycheck (in the same way that Social Security tax is 
automatically deducted from paychecks in the United States). This is done to lower the 
administrative costs of the AFPs, but this also lowers the commissions price-sensitivity of 
workers. 
The second major factor contributing to reduced competition that Valdés Prieto 
discusses is the economies of scale of the AFP system. By his econometric analysis, the 
minimum efficient scale for an AFP “as a whole” is 2,000,000 affiliates and 1,000,000 
contributors. Meanwhile, if only “pure production” costs are considered (eliminating the 
cost of marketing, for example), the minimum efficient scale falls to 300,000 affiliates 
and 150,000 contributors. Given that the size of the Chilean labor force as reported by the 
Central Bank of Chile in January 2017 (the most recent date available) was 8.8 million 
people, this would suggest that the market can only sustain four AFPs at the low end, and 
twenty-nine AFPs as a theoretical maximum. A December 2014 report conducted by the 
                                                
53 Arenas de Mesa 2000, p. 47, emphasis added 
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office of the Subsecretary for Social Provision found that a 2008 reform has reduced 
some of the barriers to entry. The reform, known as licitación (licitation), mandates that 
all new AFP affiliates enroll for two years in the AFP that charges the lowest 
commission. In effect, this created an auction mechanism where AFPs bid for customers 
by offering the lowest commission. This allows smaller firms to gain market share 
relatively quickly by winning the licitation. From 2009-2013, the average commission 
fell and the national HHI of the AFP in terms of affiliates fell from 2,886 to 2,315.54 
Scholarship on Chilean Regional Development 
 Regionalism is totally neglected in academic studies and policy discussions of the 
AFP. For example, the seminal 2015 Final Report from the Presidential Advisory 
Commission on the Pension System, a 247-page document designed to act as the lodestar 
for the administration of President Michelle Bachelet with regards to the pension system, 
conducts no regional analysis.55 Nor does the official plan for a new pension system 
proposed by No Más AFP (“No More AFP”), the chief organization for opposition to the 
AFP.56 This may be the case because issues such as increasing pension amounts and 
increasing gender equity are more salient politically. It also may be a result of the 
population concentration around Santiago. Domestic policy in Chile is often accused of 
bias towards the capitol. Finally, international scholarship may also be less concerned 
with or less aware of regional differentials. Reports conducted by the World Bank, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), 
                                                
54 Chile. Subsecretaría De Previsión Social. Barreras de entrada, concentración y competencia en el 
mercado de las AFP. By Marcos Barraza Gómez. Santiago: Dirección De Estudios Previsionales, 2014. 
Print. p. 9 
55 Chile. Comisión Asesora Presidencial Sobre El Sistema De Pensiones. Informe Final. By David Bravo. 
1st ed. Santiago, 2015. Print. 
56 Nuevo sistema de pensiones para Chile. Santiago: Coordinadora Nacional De Trabajadores No Más AFP, 
2016. Print. 
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and the Social Security Administration tend to focus on the macroeconomic effects of the 
AFP and its comparability to other pension systems. 
One of the few academic analyses which noted regional differences in the AFP is 
Arenas de Mesa 2000, “Provisional Coverage in Chile: Lessons and Challenges of the 
Pension System Administered by the Private Sector”. He makes two important points. 
First, when he conducted the study, only Regions II, XII, and RM had coverage rates 
above the national average. Meanwhile, he calls the coverage rates of Regions IV, VII, 
IX, and X “persistently” poor. Second, he attributes the poor coverage rates to the 
predominance of agriculture in these regions. He argues that the lack of formalization in 
agriculture results in poor coverage rates.57 
Arenas de Mesa’s findings coincide well with the analysis in the 2010 paper 
“Concentration and Growth in Chile: An Ignored Negative Relationship” by Miguel 
Atienza and Patricio Aroca, professors of economics at the Catholic University of the 
North. While this was not a study on the AFP, the researchers find that from 1990-2010 
regional inequality has increased in Chile. They attribute some of the increase in regional 
inequality to inter-regional trade flows and labor mobility. They find that Regions I, II, 
III, X, XI, and XII are net recipients of workers, while Regions IV-IX and RM are net 
donors of workers, meaning that individuals in the donor regions are moving to the 
recipient regions in search of work.58 They remark: “These results reveal the need to 
incorporate explicitly and actively the ‘regional problem’ in the national development 
                                                
57 Arenas de Mesa 2000, p. 35 
58 Atienza, Miguel, and Patricio Aroca. “Concentración y crecimiento en Chile: Una relación negativa 
Ignorada.” Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Urbano Regionales 38.114 (2012): 257-77. Print. p. 268; 
Neither Arenas de Mesa 2000 nor Atienza and Aroca analyze Regions XIV and XV because they were 
created in 2007. 
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strategy, not only as an equity problem, but also as part of the policies oriented to 
improve the efficiency of the Chilean economy.”59 
Summary of Chapter II 
The first subsection of Chapter II “Methodology: The Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index” explained the HHI and why it is a useful measure. Next, Chapter II discussed 
scholarly literature relevant to the understanding of my analysis in Chapter III. The 
subsection “Scholarship on the Market Competitiveness of the AFP” comprised academic 
research on aspects of the AFP that affect market competitiveness. It is important to note 
that because participation in the AFP is mandatory, yet financial literacy is low, the AFP 
exhibits significant distortions from a normal market. Finally, the subsection 
“Scholarship on Chilean Regional Development” highlighted the deficit of regional 
analyses on the AFP, but included some studies that support the assertion that regional 
differences in development are affecting the AFP. 
 
 
                                                
59 Atienza and Aroca, p. 257 
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CHAPTER III: ANALYSIS OF MARKET COMPETITION IN THE 
AFP 
Table 3 contains the national market shares and corresponding HHI in the AFP, as 
of December 2016. The data come from the Trimestral Statistical Report of Affiliates and 
Contributors (“Informe Estadístico Trimestral de Afiliados y Cotizantes”) and were 
released on February 10, 2017. I calculate market concentration by two different 
measures: the share of affiliates and the share of contributors. The share of affiliates 
reflects each AFP’s share of persons who have ever enrolled with an AFP. This includes 
those currently in the labor force, as well as people who have retired, have given up work 
but enrolled with an AFP at some point, and have opened accounts voluntarily (such as a 
parent might for a child, for example). The share of contributors is each AFP’s share of 
the subset of affiliates who made contributions in December 2016 on wages they earned 
in November 2016.   
Table 3: AFP National Market Concentration December 2016 
Measure: 
AFP Market Share  
HHI 
Capital Cuprum Habitat Modelo Planvital Provida 
Affiliates 16.8% 6.1% 20.0% 14.8% 11.4% 30.9% 2,022 
Contributors 17.2% 8.1% 21.6% 12.9% 10.4% 29.7% 1,988 
Contrib. % of Affiliates 102.4% 132.6% 108.0% 87.7% 91.0% 96.3% 98.3% 
 
AFPs make their profits through commissions on affiliate contributions and 
through a commission on the amassed balance upon retirement. The fixed costs of AFPs 
	 34 
are high, while the variable costs are low.60 Affiliates who do not contribute and do not 
have a high account balance represent fixed costs to AFPs. Because certain workers are 
more likely to be contributors than others, companies will direct their resources towards 
attracting customers who will be continuous contributors. In addition, the affiliation rate, 
as previously noted, is about 100% of the labor force, while the average monthly 
contribution rate is 65%. Therefore, the market share in terms of contributors is likely the 
more accurate reflection of how companies are prioritizing themselves in the market. The 
market share in terms of affiliates is still useful for comparative reasons. The last row 
“Contrib. % of Affiliates” compares each AFPs market share in terms of contributors to 
its market share in terms of affiliates. For example, AFP Cuprum’s market share in terms 
of contributors is 132.6% its market share in terms of affiliates. Meanwhile, AFP 
Modelo’s market share in terms of contributors is 87.7% its market share in terms of 
affiliates. More simply, AFP Cuprum has a 32.6% larger market share in terms of 
contributors than in terms of affiliates, while AFP Modelo has a 12.3% smaller market 
share in terms of contributors than in terms of affiliates. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices as calculated by both share of affiliates and 
share of contributors are close, with the contributors HHI 1.7% smaller than the affiliates 
HHI. To qualify the magnitude of the HHI, I compare it to the theoretical minimum HHI 
for a six-firm market—1,667—which is equivalent to a no concentration scenario in 
which all firms have equal market shares of 16.7%. The national HHI as calculated by 
share of affiliates, 2,022, is 21.3% bigger than the minimum possible HHI. The national 
HHI as calculated by share of contributors, 1,988, is 19.3% bigger than the minimum 
                                                
60 Barraza Gómez, 6 
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possible HHI. By the DOJ and FNE’s standards, these HHI indicate markets that are 
“moderately concentrated” and would merit heightened scrutiny. The differences between 
the affiliate and contributor market shares is illuminating. AFPs Capital, Cuprum, and 
Habitat all have greater market share as measured by contributors, while AFPs Modelo, 
Planvital, and Provida have greater market share as measured by affiliates. This indicates 
that AFPs Capital, Habitat, and especially Cuprum are adept at profiling and attracting 
affiliates who are likely to be contributors, as well as profiling and avoiding affiliates 
who are not likely to be contributors.  
The State of AFP Market Concentration by Region: 
The December 2016 divisions in the national market only explain part of the level 
of concentration in the AFP system. At the regional level, there are substantial 
differentials in market concentration as measured by the HHI. Previous studies that have 
only calculated the national HHI have neglected to notice these differentials. The regions 
are in geographic order from north to south. 
 Table 4: Overview of AFP Market Concentration by Region  
Region Affiliates HHI 
Contributors 
HHI 
Contributors HHI 
% of Affiliates 
HHI 
Affiliates HHI 
Increase from 
Min. 
Contributors HHI 
Increase from 
Min. 
XV 2081 2015 96.9% 24.8% 20.9% 
I 1821 1768 97.1% 9.2% 6.0% 
II 1800 1787 99.3% 8.0% 7.2% 
III 2349 2236 95.2% 40.9% 34.1% 
IV 2455 2294 93.5% 47.3% 37.6% 
V 2138 2106 98.5% 28.2% 26.3% 
RM 1903 1894 99.5% 14.1% 13.6% 
VI 2322 2270 97.8% 39.3% 36.2% 
VII 2486 2442 98.2% 49.1% 46.5% 
VIII 2159 2163 100.2% 29.5% 29.7% 
IX 2386 2323 97.4% 43.1% 39.3% 
XIV 2161 2156 99.8% 29.6% 29.3% 
X 2134 2074 97.2% 28.0% 24.4% 
XI 2379 2301 96.7% 42.7% 38.0% 
XII 1906 1892 99.3% 14.3% 13.5% 
National 2,022 1,988 98.3% 121.3% 119.3% 
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As seen in Table 4, by both share of affiliates and share of contributors, the 
regional HHI is lower than the national HHI in regions I, II, RM, and XII. In all other 
regions, the regional HHI is higher than the national HHI. That the regional HHI is lower 
than the national HHI in Regions I, II, RM, and XII is not surprising, given the 
geographic introduction to Chile in Chapter I. In this case, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Indices mirror the level of regional GDP per capita. Regions I and II are the centers of 
Chile’s mining activity and thus have high regional GDP. The harsh landscape of the 
Atacama Desert makes living conditions tough, and so Regions I and II have low 
populations as well, further contributing to high regional GDP per capita. As measured 
by share of affiliates, Region II has the lowest HHI and Region I has the second lowest 
HHI. As measured by share of contributors, Region I has the lowest HHI and Region II 
has the second lowest HHI. RM (Santiago) is the most developed region and has high 
regional GDP. Despite containing 40% of the population of Chile, it still has high 
regional GDP per capita. Finally, Region XII has a smaller regional economy on an 
absolute scale than that of Regions I, II, and RM, but because its population is so small, it 
has a relatively high regional GDP per capita as well. Most disconcerting is the case of 
Region VII, with an affiliate HHI of 2,486 (49.1% above the minimum) and a contributor 
HHI of 2,442 (46.5% above the minimum). This is close to the DOJ and FNE marker of 
2,500 for “highly concentrated” markets—a level of concentration that is acceptable only 
in rare cases. Considering that the HHI of Region I as calculated by share of contributors 
is only 6% larger than the minimum possible HHI, the Region VII HHI is unacceptable 
and there is much that AFPs and the government could do to increase market competition 
there. 
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In every region other than Region VIII, the HHI as calculated by share of 
contributors is lower than the HHI as calculated by share of affiliates, supporting the 
assertion that certain types of customers are tacitly avoided. This is even more clearly 
illustrated in Table 5. The table contains the market shares of each AFP in each region 
which were used to derive the Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices. The table is colored such 
that the smallest market share in the system is colored dark red (in both the case of 
affiliates and contributors, AFP Cuprum in Region VII at 3.8%, and 5.2%, respectively), 
the middle market share is colored yellow (the median market share is 14.03% for 
affiliates and 14.53% for contributors), and the greatest market share is colored dark 
green (in the case of affiliates, AFP Provida in Region IV at 41.7%, and in the case of 
contributors, AFP Provida in Region VII at 40.1%). The colors of the shares change 
progressively between those levels. This coloring makes it more intuitive to visualize 
conclusions that may be drawn about the AFPs and regions. 
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Table 5: Derivation of AFP Market Concentration by Region  
AFFILIATES (December 2016) 
Region AFP Market Share (%) Regional HHI 
Number 
Affiliates Capital Cuprum Habitat Modelo Planvital Provida 
XV 16.0% 5.5% 31.4% 15.5% 9.9% 21.6% 2,081 188,102 
I 18.6% 8.5% 20.0% 16.5% 12.4% 24.0% 1,821 366,956 
II 15.0% 13.7% 17.6% 16.1% 11.4% 26.3% 1,800 170,536 
III 13.9% 10.9% 13.4% 12.4% 9.1% 40.2% 2,349 378,474 
IV 12.5% 6.5% 14.6% 12.3% 12.4% 41.7% 2,455 945,854 
V 19.0% 5.6% 19.3% 12.4% 10.4% 33.3% 2,138 488,448 
RM 17.5% 6.4% 21.9% 17.2% 11.6% 25.4% 1,903 540,631 
VI 14.1% 5.4% 13.4% 11.1% 17.4% 38.6% 2,322 1,003,292 
VII 18.6% 3.8% 11.7% 11.0% 13.9% 40.9% 2,486 458,394 
VIII 17.2% 5.7% 21.5% 12.5% 9.7% 33.5% 2,159 453,663 
IX 15.9% 4.4% 16.7% 13.6% 10.0% 39.4% 2,386 59,883 
XIV 17.6% 3.8% 24.2% 12.6% 10.5% 31.4% 2,161 104,945 
X 18.4% 5.4% 18.1% 11.9% 12.4% 33.8% 2,134 4,477,431 
XI 23.2% 4.1% 11.4% 10.7% 13.1% 37.6% 2,379 185,371 
XII 20.5% 6.7% 21.6% 10.9% 15.4% 24.9% 1,906 119,420 
National* 16.8% 6.1% 20.0% 14.8% 11.4% 30.9% 2,022 10,178,437 
CONTRIBUTORS (December 2016) 
Region AFP Market Share (%) Regional HHI 
Number 
Contributors Capital Cuprum Habitat Modelo Planvital Provida 
XV 16.1% 7.9% 30.8% 13.7% 10.2% 21.3% 2,015 59,048 
I 18.3% 11.8% 20.8% 14.2% 12.4% 22.5% 1,768 90,702 
II 15.9% 17.7% 18.8% 12.9% 10.3% 24.4% 1,787 191,196 
III 15.4% 15.2% 14.5% 9.6% 7.8% 37.4% 2,236 87,346 
IV 13.8% 9.0% 16.2% 10.1% 12.0% 38.9% 2,294 188,002 
V 18.7% 7.3% 21.4% 11.0% 9.5% 32.2% 2,106 490,803 
RM 17.5% 8.1% 24.0% 15.6% 10.4% 24.4% 1,894 2,377,863 
VI 14.5% 7.2% 15.0% 9.4% 16.0% 37.9% 2,270 268,937 
VII 19.5% 5.2% 13.2% 9.0% 12.9% 40.1% 2,442 287,003 
VIII 17.2% 7.6% 23.4% 10.8% 8.1% 32.9% 2,163 539,691 
IX 16.0% 6.4% 18.9% 11.8% 8.7% 38.1% 2,323 222,233 
XIV 17.2% 5.5% 25.4% 10.3% 10.4% 31.2% 2,156 92,628 
X 19.5% 7.3% 19.8% 10.3% 11.1% 31.9% 2,074 227,401 
XI 25.7% 5.6% 13.8% 9.2% 10.8% 34.9% 2,301 29,129 
XII 22.4% 9.0% 22.4% 9.6% 13.5% 23.1% 1,892 54,770 
National* 17.2% 8.1% 21.6% 12.9% 10.4% 29.7% 1,988 5,284,337 
*237,037 affiliates and 77,585 contributors did not indicate their region. 
 
In Table 5, the eye is immediately drawn to the market shares of AFP Cuprum in 
Regions II and III (which in both the case of affiliates and contributors have its 1st and 2nd 
highest market shares). While in the other regions, AFP Cuprum’s market share is 
approximately the same or less than its national market share, in these regions, by share 
of affiliates, it is 2.2 and 1.8 times its national market share, and, by share of contributors, 
it is 2.2 and 1.9 times its national market share. Meanwhile, in both Region XIV, its 
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worst region by share of affiliates, and in Region VII, its worst region by share of 
contributors, its market share is 0.6 times its national market share. AFP Cuprum also has 
the smallest market share in every region other than Regions II and III, by both 
calculations of market share. Although AFPs by law must operate at a national level and 
accept all workers who wish to affiliate with them, it does not mean that they will devote 
the same resources nationally to their acquisition and service. Per its own Annual 
Review, AFP Cuprum is “closely linked to copper mining”.61 “Cuprum” is Latin for 
copper. AFP Cuprum was founded in 1981 by the Asociación Gremial Nacional de 
Supervisores del Cobre (“National Trade Union of Copper Supervisors”, ANSCO), the 
trade union for management in the copper industry. These data, as well as its foundation 
and name, suggest that AFP Cuprum focuses its business where specifically copper 
mining is important. Workers in the copper mining industry or who live in those regions 
with a significant presence of copper mining, therefore, may have better outcomes in the 
pension system and the greater social security system. 
 In Table 5, bands of color are also instructive. The color scheme helps to visualize 
the relative equality of market share in Regions I and II. Regions I and II are both more 
yellow across the table than the other regions. On the other hand, the color scheme helps 
to indicate the lack of equality in other regions. Regions with high Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Indices such as IV, VII, IX, and XI have greater variation in their colors. Finally, I wish 
to call attention to AFP Modelo’s market share in RM. In both tables, this region has its 
highest market share. I would surmise that this is because AFP Modelo won the licitation 
for 2010-2012 and 2012-2014. This means that Modelo offered the lowest commission, 
                                                
61 Silva Bafalluy, Ernesto. Memoria anual y los estados financieros de AFP Cuprum S.A. Rep. Santiago, 
2006. Print. p. 19 
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so all new affiliates in those time periods had to register and stay affiliated with AFP 
Modelo for at least two years from the date of their affiliation. Since RM, the Santiago 
metropolitan area, is by far the most populous region, AFP Modelo would see the largest 
increase in its market share here. Since this reform has resulted in the lowest commission 
rate for each subsequent period of its implementation (from 2010 onwards), it may be an 
efficient way to “redistribute” market share. 
The State of AFP Market Concentration by Income Tax Bracket: 
Previous studies have also neglected to notice the differentials that are present 
when market concentration is calculated at the level of different income tax brackets. 
Table 6 also contains data from the December 2016 Trimestral Statistical Report of 
Affiliates and Contributors. This time, market concentration at different income levels is 
calculated—meaning, each income level is treated as if it were a distinct market, such as 
a region. For example, the first row in Table 6 contains information on AFP contributors 
in December 2016 whose monthly income was less than 20-thousand pesos. In this case, 
20,221 contributors—0.4% of all contributors—fell in this category. 12.7% contributed to 
AFP Capital, 1.9% contributed to AFP Cuprum, 14.0% contributed to AFP Habitat, 
20.6% contributed to AFP Modelo, 19.3% contributed to AFP Planvital, and 31.6% 
contributed to AFP Provida. Thus, the HHI for this income tax bracket is 2,152—or 
29.1% greater than the minimum possible HHI of 1,667. Since the median monthly 
income of all Chilean workers is $300,000 Chilean pesos (roughly $450 U.S. dollars), 
while the median monthly income of AFP contributors is about $500,000 Chilean pesos 
(roughly $750 U.S. dollars), AFP contributors are wealthier on average. The SAFP only 
collects data for different income tax brackets in terms of contributors, so there is no 
comparison that can be made for market share of affiliates.  
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Table 6: AFP Market Concentration by Income Tax Bracket 
Income Tax 
Bracket 
(Thousands of 
Pesos) 
Number 
of 
Contrib. 
Running 
Total 
Contrib. 
AFP Market Share (%) 
HHI 
Increase 
from 
Min. 
HHI 
Capital Cuprum Habitat Modelo Planvital Provida 
< 20 20,221 0.4% 12.7% 1.9% 14.0% 20.6% 19.3% 31.6% 2,152 29.1% 
[20 – 40) 33,239 1.0% 12.2% 1.8% 15.4% 19.6% 18.2% 32.9% 2,182 30.9% 
[40 – 60) 32,351 1.6% 12.2% 2.1% 15.3% 18.6% 18.0% 33.7% 2,197 31.8% 
[60 – 100) 77,280 3.1% 12.8% 1.9% 15.4% 18.7% 17.1% 34.1% 2,209 32.5% 
[100 – 150) 148,498 5.9% 13.5% 1.9% 15.6% 16.3% 16.2% 36.4% 2,286 37.1% 
[150 – 200) 135,000 8.5% 13.0% 1.9% 15.5% 19.6% 18.3% 31.7% 2,139 28.3% 
[200 – 250) 138,649 11.1% 13.8% 1.8% 15.5% 20.0% 17.3% 31.5% 2,129 27.7% 
[250 – 300) 462,264 19.8% 16.5% 2.6% 17.3% 12.1% 12.8% 38.7% 2,387 43.2% 
[300 – 350)* 507,741 29.4% 15.0% 2.1% 17.8% 14.8% 14.1% 36.3% 2,279 36.7% 
[350 – 400) 350,218 36.1% 15.8% 2.3% 18.6% 16.1% 13.2% 34.0% 2,192 31.5% 
[400 – 450) 303,427 41.8% 16.5% 2.5% 19.5% 16.1% 11.7% 33.7% 2,192 31.5% 
[450 – 500) 284,213 47.2% 17.2% 3.0% 20.8% 14.9% 10.7% 33.4% 2,190 31.4% 
[500 – 550)** 246,406 51.8% 17.9% 3.1% 21.3% 14.3% 10.0% 33.4% 2,202 32.1% 
[550 – 600) 219,497 56.0% 18.3% 3.8% 22.9% 13.0% 8.8% 33.2% 2,223 33.4% 
[600 – 650) 208,823 59.9% 19.0% 4.2% 22.6% 13.0% 9.3% 31.9% 2,163 29.7% 
[650 – 700) 171,866 63.2% 18.9% 5.0% 24.2% 12.1% 8.2% 31.6% 2,180 30.8% 
[700 – 750) 157,849 66.2% 19.2% 5.5% 24.6% 11.8% 8.1% 30.8% 2,155 29.3% 
[750 – 800) 140,414 68.8% 19.5% 6.4% 25.1% 11.5% 7.9% 29.6% 2,122 27.3% 
[800 – 850) 125,084 71.2% 19.4% 7.2% 25.9% 10.8% 7.5% 29.1% 2,123 27.4% 
[850 – 900) 113,959 73.4% 19.5% 8.5% 25.8% 11.0% 7.6% 27.7% 2,061 23.7% 
[900 – 950) 98,364 75.2% 19.4% 9.5% 26.2% 10.3% 7.3% 27.3% 2,056 23.3% 
[950 – 1,000) 93,024 77.0% 19.6% 11.0% 25.9% 10.5% 7.4% 25.7% 1,998 19.9% 
[1,000 – 1,050) 76,650 78.4% 19.6% 11.8% 26.0% 10.0% 7.1% 25.5% 1,999 19.9% 
[1,050 – 1,100) 68,494 79.7% 19.8% 12.8% 26.7% 9.6% 6.8% 24.4% 1,997 19.8% 
[1,100 – 1,150) 65,307 81.0% 19.5% 14.1% 26.2% 9.7% 7.3% 23.2% 1,950 17.0% 
[1,150 – 1,200) 57,820 82.1% 19.6% 15.4% 26.2% 9.4% 6.8% 22.6% 1,954 17.2% 
[1,200 – 1,250) 50,823 83.0% 19.8% 15.5% 25.9% 9.6% 7.1% 22.1% 1,933 16.0% 
[1,250 – 1,300) 51,485 84.0% 19.5% 17.1% 26.7% 9.8% 6.7% 20.2% 1,934 16.0% 
[1,300 – 1,350) 42,826 84.8% 20.0% 17.6% 26.3% 8.9% 6.5% 20.7% 1,951 17.0% 
[1,350 – 1,400) 42,852 85.6% 19.0% 18.8% 26.9% 9.6% 6.6% 19.0% 1,938 16.2% 
[1,400 – 1,450) 36,805 86.3% 19.4% 19.3% 26.9% 9.0% 6.5% 18.9% 1,954 17.2% 
[1,450 – 1,500) 37,074 87.0% 19.2% 20.3% 25.8% 9.5% 7.1% 18.1% 1,916 14.9% 
[1,500 – 1,550) 35,965 87.7% 19.1% 21.4% 26.8% 8.9% 5.9% 17.9% 1,975 18.5% 
[1,550 – 1,600) 33,018 88.3% 18.6% 21.9% 25.5% 9.7% 7.3% 17.0% 1,912 14.7% 
[1,600 – 1,650) 31,743 88.9% 18.6% 22.4% 26.4% 9.2% 6.5% 17.0% 1,957 17.4% 
[1,650 – 1,700) 27,549 89.4% 18.4% 23.5% 26.3% 9.4% 6.1% 16.3% 1,974 18.4% 
[1,700 – 1,750) 25,770 89.9% 18.6% 23.8% 26.5% 8.9% 5.7% 16.5% 2,000 20.0% 
[1,750 – 1,800) 26,501 90.4% 18.3% 24.3% 26.3% 8.9% 6.0% 16.2% 1,995 19.7% 
[1,800 – 1,850) 23,501 90.9% 18.3% 25.3% 26.2% 8.5% 5.8% 15.9% 2,020 21.2% 
[1,850 – 1,900) 23,305 91.3% 18.3% 25.2% 25.7% 9.4% 5.7% 15.6% 1,998 19.9% 
[1,900 – 1,950) 27,602 91.8% 18.7% 26.6% 27.1% 8.0% 5.2% 14.4% 2,089 25.3% 
≥ 1950 430,860 100.0% 17.9% 32.1% 26.6% 6.9% 4.3% 12.1% 2,275 36.5% 
National 5,284,337 100% 17.22% 8.11% 21.62% 12.95% 10.38% 29.72% 1,988 19.3% 
*300 thousand pesos is the median monthly income of all Chilean workers (roughly $450 U.S. dollars). 
**About 500 thousand pesos is the median monthly income of AFP contributors (roughly $750 U.S. dollars). 
 
In Table 6, the income tax brackets from [1,100 – 1,700) thousand pesos monthly, 
or about 3.5–5.2 times the median monthly income, have HHI below the national HHI. 
All other income tax brackets have HHI higher than the national HHI. The market is 
more concentrated at the lowest income levels, is the most concentrated near the median 
monthly income, becomes less concentrated as the share of income increases, and finally 
at greater than or equal to $1,950 thousand pesos monthly—about 6 times the median 
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monthly income, the highest level provided—the market becomes more concentrated 
again. It should be noted that there is more concentration when each income tax bracket 
is defined as its own market compared with the market concentration in each region. The 
income tax bracket that is least concentrated is the bracket for persons with a monthly 
income from [1,550 – 1,600) thousand pesos—more than five times the median monthly 
income. The HHI for this income tax bracket is 1,912—14.7% greater than the minimum 
possible HHI. Meanwhile, the least concentrated regional market is the market for 
contributors in Region I, with an HHI of 1,768—6.0% greater than the minimum possible 
HHI.  
The high market concentration at lower income levels and the median income is 
alarming, given the share of the population of contributors that these income levels 
represent. The monthly income tax bracket of [250 – 300) thousand pesos is the most 
concentrated and contains 8.7% of the population. The median monthly income bracket is 
the third most concentrated and contains 9.6% of the population. Yet, the least 
concentrated income tax bracket of [1,550 – 1,600) thousand pesos contains .6% of the 
population. Moreover, the poorest 79.7% of income tax brackets have HHI that are above 
the national HHI. Viewed in another way, most of the population is exposed to a more 
concentrated market, while about 10% of the richest income tax brackets are exposed to a 
less concentrated market. Therefore, the market for the contributions of the poorest 
79.7% of Chileans is less competitive than the market for the contributions of the richest 
Chileans.  
The market concentration by income tax bracket also bolsters the assertion that 
AFPs tacitly avoid certain customers and seek others. AFP Cuprum has an anemic share 
of customers in lower income tax brackets. From the income tax brackets of (0 – 850) 
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thousand pesos per month, or 0 to about 2.8 times the median income, AFP Cuprum’s 
market share is lower than its national market share and is lower than every other AFP’s 
market share in each respective bracket. AFP Cuprum does not have the largest market 
share in any income tax bracket, save for the highest bracket for which there are data, the 
bracket of greater than or equal to 1,950 thousand pesos per month—more than 6 times 
the median monthly income and greater. In contrast, AFP Capital has much more 
constant market share in all income tax brackets. AFP Habitat’s market share increases 
with income tax bracket, but it does not have as much of a deficit with lower income tax 
brackets as AFP Cuprum. AFPs Modelo and Planvital have their highest market shares in 
the bottom income tax brackets. This is likely due to Modelo’s winning the licitation 
from 2010–2014, and Planvital’s winning from 2014–2018. All new AFP enrollees in 
these time periods have gone to those AFPs. As these are first-time workers, they 
disproportionately are a part of the lowest income tax brackets. Finally, AFP Provida 
experiences an opposite change in market share from AFP Habitat. AFP Provida 
comparably dominates the lowest income tax brackets, and loses market share as income 
increases. This is interesting also due to the licitation. Before 2010, AFP Provida must 
have had an especially large share of the contributors in the bottom income tax brackets, 
given that for now seven years, new affiliates have not been able to enroll with AFP 
Provida.  
 
 
 
	 44 
It is necessary to concede that when considering different income levels in a 
normal market, the different commissions charged would be important in the selection of 
an AFP. The commissions until January 1st,  2018 are as follows: 
Table 7: AFP Commissions Structure 
Commission Charged: 
AFP On Contributions 
On Final 
Balance 
Capital 1.44% 1.25% 
Cuprum 1.48% 1.25% 
Habitat 1.27% 0.95% 
Modelo 0.77% 1.20% 
Planvital 0.41% 1.25% 
Provida 1.54% 1.25% 
Average 1.15% 1.19% 
 
But the AFP is not a normal market! The AFP is a complex intersection of the Chilean 
social security and financial systems in which all Chileans are forced to participate. This 
creates the huge distortions from a healthy market that Valdés Prieto and other 
researchers have observed. The returns posted by each AFP have historically been 
similar, and in Arenas de Mesa’s study, only 2% of AFP affiliates knew the commission 
they paid to their AFP. Thus, workers are selecting their AFPs less so based on returns 
and commissions and more so based on other factors. The commissions data overall may 
support the argument that AFPs tacitly discriminate against some customers. Cuprum 
charges the second highest monthly commission in the system, which may contribute to 
its poor performance with lower income tax brackets. However, Capital’s monthly 
commission of 1.44% is only .028 times smaller than Cuprum’s commission of 1.48%, 
yet it has 4–5 times higher market share in all the lower income tax brackets. Most 
astoundingly, AFP Provida charges the highest monthly commission in the system, but it 
dominates the market for the lowest income individuals. Hence, it can be concluded that 
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AFP Capital targets all customers more evenly, while AFP Cuprum targets the richest 
customers and AFP Provida targets the poorest customers. Since AFP Cuprum averaged 
1st place while AFP Provida averaged 5th place in the Quality of Service to Affiliate 
Index,62 combined with the fact that AFP Provida charges the highest commission rates, 
AFP Provida’s success with poorer Chileans is not due to a specialization in their favor 
but some other factor. 
Conclusions 
By providing for pensions in a commissions-based market, the Administrators of 
Pension Funds does not incentivize pension providers to evenly target all Chileans, but 
rather to target the wealthiest Chileans. In the AFP, the wealthiest regions in Chile have 
the lowest concentration of market share, and the highest income tax brackets have the 
lowest concentration of market share. This indicates that competition in the AFP is most 
vigorous in wealthy regions and for wealthy Chileans. I assert that these differentials in 
competition are not merely descriptive, but also self-reinforcing. Competition may 
influence the rate at which workers make their monthly contributions. Consider the 
following feedback loops: In more competitive regions, one would expect there to be 
more advertising related to the pension system, more AFP staff, and more AFP offices. 
One would also expect that wealthy Chileans are more targeted with advertising related 
to the pension system, receive more contact from AFP staff, and have superior access to 
AFP offices. This may result in persons in those regions and of those income levels 
having a better understanding of the function of the pension system and the need to 
                                                
62 Indicadores de calidad de servicio de las AFP. Rep. Superintendencia de Pensiones. Web. The Index was 
published by the Superintendence of the AFP used 75 metrics to rank each AFP on overall quality of 
service. The earliest report on all six AFPs dates to September 2011 and the reports continued until January 
of 2014, when they were discontinued in favor of publishing the raw metrics without assigning rank. 
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participate and contribute. The observed contribution rate may be higher in those regions 
and for those income levels. In turn, the higher contribution rate makes the market even 
more desirable. The cycle repeats. Yet, this is alarming because the stated purpose of the 
AFP is not to generate profits for the Chilean financial sector, but to provide social 
security for the elderly. The AFP is complex, and lack of financial literacy harms the 
ability of workers to succeed in it. The main determinant of whether an individual can 
finance a comfortable pension through the AFP is the size of their AFP balance. Workers 
must contribute regularly for the entirety of their working lives. Lack of competition may 
result in some workers being under-informed about how the pension system works, and, 
therefore, not adequately prepare them to retire or provide for themselves through the 
AFP in old age.  
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CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION 
 In Harvard professor of economics Gregory Mankiw’s introductory 
macroeconomics textbook, to evaluate market outcomes, he postulates how the 
“benevolent social planner”, an “omniscient, omnipotent, benign dictator”, might make 
decisions in an economy.63 First, given some endowment of goods and services and some 
number of buyers and sellers, the benevolent social planner ensures that “society gets the 
most it can” by allocating them so as to maximize total utility—also known as Pareto 
efficiency. Pareto efficiency means that no individual can be made better off without 
making another individual worse off. Pareto efficiency is the type of efficiency that 
Chile’s economic leaders argued the AFP would be better at achieving than a 
government-administered pension system could. Markets are generally a successful 
method of allocating society’s finite goods and services, since there are unequal demands 
for them. Their view was that a competitive free market would reduce negative 
externalities that reduce the total utility of the pension system. 
Second, the benevolent social planner would divide the utility in the manner that 
is best for society. Pareto efficiency demands that total utility is maximized, but it is 
agnostic to the distribution of total utility. A distribution of total utility where one person 
receives 100% of the total utility and all others receive none of it is equally Pareto 
efficient as a distribution where each person has an equal share of total utility, so long as 
total utility is at its maximum. Mankiw writes “Whereas [Pareto efficiency] is an 
                                                
63 Mankiw, Gregory. Principles of Macroeconomics. 7th ed. Cengage Learning, 2015. Print. p. 140 
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objective goal that can be judged on strictly positive grounds, equity involves moral 
judgements that go beyond economics and enter into the realm of political philosophy.” 
While Mankiw declines to opine on his own views of equity, he analogizes the duties of 
the benevolent social planner to an “economic cake”. The benevolent social planner 
would ensure that the cake is as big as possible. It would then slice the cake in the 
manner that is best for the long-term health of society. 
The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights gives some basic 
insight into the normative judgement of how society should slice the economic cake. 
Article 22 defines social security as a human right: “Everyone, as a member of society, 
has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and 
international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each 
State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free 
development of his personality.” Further, Article 25 elaborates the meaning of social 
security, stating: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.” Therefore, governments and individuals adhering to 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights have a duty to provide for the 
social security of their citizenry and common man. While the degree of this obligation is 
debatable, most people would agree that each citizen is owed some level of security. 
My hope is that the Prologue of this thesis conveyed to the reader my sense of the 
inequity of Chile. The differences between the rich and poor there are a magnitude above 
that which we experience in the United States. There is also a smaller and weaker middle 
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class. When a society is highly unequal, as is Chile, some aspects of markets can further 
distort the inequities. A market-based pension system relies on a vigorous and 
competitive free market to be successful. A risk of a market-based pension system is that 
an uncompetitive system will leave the most vulnerable citizens behind. Social security 
systems are designed to ensure a basic level of income-security, independent of a 
worker’s success in the labor market. This assurance is in the best interest of society not 
just morally, but in an economic sense as well, because it reduces the onus of elderly care 
on the children of those with low incomes. The next generation then has more liberty to 
invest in its own human capital, which helps to alleviate the cycle of poverty. 
As I researched the AFP, I did find some academic studies that examined its 
market competitiveness. However, I feel that in studies conducted by foreign scholars and 
studies conducted by Chilean scholars (which are more likely to examine the minutia of 
the AFP), market competitiveness has been given less importance than other issues, such 
as the AFPs’ applicability to other countries or improving the pension replacement rate. I 
searched academic databases, Google and Google Scholar, the World Bank, the OECD, 
CEPAL, and the libraries of major Chilean universities. When market competition in the 
AFP is discussed, it is usually as an aside to some other aspect of the AFP. Of the studies 
I found that had a primary focus of investigating the market competitiveness of the AFP, 
they all exclusively considered the market competitiveness at the national level. Even 
fewer used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure market concentration in the AFP. 
I could find no studies that measured the HHI on a regional level, nor on the level of 
different income tax brackets, as I have. Thus, one contribution of this thesis is that it is 
more than just national in scope in investigating the market competitiveness of the AFP 
and in employing the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to do so. 
	 50 
In Chapter III, I establish, as have other researchers, that the national market of 
the Chilean pension system exhibits a high degree of concentration. The AFP market is 
inherently concentrated, with a minimum-possible Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 1,667. 
This minimum-possible level is described by both the United States Department of 
Justice and the Chilean National Economic Prosecutor as meriting increased scrutiny. 
Still, the observed indices at the national level of 2,022 for the market concentration as 
measured by share of affiliates and 1,988 for the market concentration as measured by 
share of contributors are approximately 20% greater than this minimum threshold. 
Meaning the intrinsically concentrated AFP market has an even higher observed 
concentration. 
The HHI vary substantially at a regional level from their national counterparts. 
The First and Second Regions (which are home to significant mining activity), the 
Santiago Metropolitan Region (which dominates the country politically, economically, 
and culturally), and the Twelfth Region (which enjoys natural resource wealth relative to 
its low population) all have HHI below the national average, which indicates that the 
AFP market is more competitive there. Those regions all have high GDP per-capita. 
Meanwhile, the eleven other regions have HHI above the national average, which 
indicates that the AFP market is less competitive there. This is not just a matter of 
position above or below the national average though. The variation is also substantial in 
absolute terms. The First Region HHI as measured by share of contributors—1,768—is 
6.0% greater than the minimum possible HHI. Meanwhile, the Seventh Region HHI—
2,442—is 46.5% greater than the minimum possible HHI. The Seventh Region HHI is 
equivalent to there being one fewer firm in the market and is 58 points below the marker 
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HHI of 2,500—a level of concentration that is nearly always unacceptable to antitrust 
regulators. 
Similar variations are also evident in the analysis of the HHI by different income 
tax brackets. The HHI for persons who earned $1.1–$1.7 million pesos per-month (3.5–
5.2 times the median income) are below the national average. The HHI for all other 
income tax brackets are above the national average. While the variation between the 
income tax bracket with the lowest HHI and the income tax bracket with the highest HHI 
is less than the variation between the region with the lowest HHI and the region with the 
highest HHI, it is still significant. The income tax bracket that is least concentrated is the 
bracket for persons with a monthly income from $1.550–$1.6 million pesos (about five 
times the median monthly income), with an HHI of 1,916—or 14.9% higher than the 
minimum. The income tax bracket that is most concentrated is the bracket for persons 
with a monthly income from $250–$300 thousand pesos (about 0.8 times the median 
monthly income), with an HHI of 2,387—or 43.2% higher than the minimum. The 
income tax bracket analysis is alarming, however, because of the population and wealth 
distribution. The market for the contributions of the poorest 79.7% of Chileans is less 
competitive than the market for the contributions of the richest Chileans. Clustered from 
zero to three times the median income, the HHI is at least approximately 30% bigger than 
the minimum possible HHI. These may understate the true lack of competition at the 
lowest income levels, as the median monthly income of contributors is about 1.5 times 
the median monthly income of all Chilean workers. Since there is no affiliate data by 
income tax bracket, I cannot compare the indices of contributors to affiliates. 
I believe that regions and income tax brackets with high contribution rates attract 
greater interest from the AFPs because AFPs generate their profits from commissions on 
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contributions. Since these regions and income tax brackets contribute more regularly and 
at higher amounts, these are the most valuable regions and customers. On the other hand, 
a consequence of this system is that regions and income tax brackets with low 
contribution rates and low contribution amounts will receive less interest from AFPs. 
These are the least valuable regions and customers. I argue that wealthy regions are 
subject to virtuous cycles, where their high coverage rates are strengthened by higher 
market competition, and that poor regions are subject to vicious cycles, where their poor 
coverage rates are further weakened by a lack of market competition. I believe the same 
is true for wealthy and poor income tax brackets. This system provides higher individual 
security to workers who can benefit from more market competition, but for the large 
swaths of the population who must contend with less market competition, their individual 
security is undermined.  
Most affected by this dynamic are the poor, such as my Chilean nana, who need 
some form of social security. It is easy to envision how she could fit into this vicious 
cycle. I do not know if my nana ever enrolled with an AFP, nevertheless contributes to 
one. Because she is classified as an independent worker, she was not obliged to 
participate in the AFP until 2014, and because she is paid under the table, she could still 
get away with not participating, if she wanted to. If she were to be participating, with 
such a low monthly income, it would be a struggle to be able to meet a 10% contribution 
requirement and still afford to provide for herself and her family—any contributions she 
made would realistically be infrequent and in low amounts. Overall, AFPs will avoid 
affiliates such as my nana because what Valdés Prieto calls the “pure production” costs of 
maintaining their accounts—regulatory compliance, attention to customer, monthly 
account disclosures, etcetera—will outweigh the meager profits the AFPs will generate 
	 53 
from commissions on their contributions. Furthermore, based on the logic of the profit 
motive, it does not make sense for AFPs to incur additional costs by sending salespersons 
to the neighborhood in which my nana lives, opening offices there, or creating 
advertising directly targeted to her. Overall, those actions would decrease AFP profits 
even more. I would expect, then, that my nana is comparatively less informed about the 
pension system than a person of higher economic status. If she does not understand how 
the AFP works, she will be even less successful in the pension system than her income 
alone would indicate because she will not understand the importance of contributing. 
 My analysis makes two policy recommendations clear to me. First, the Chilean 
government should assess if the variations in market concentration of the AFP by region 
and income tax bracket correspond to similar variations in knowledge of the pension 
system by region and income tax bracket. If so, the government should attempt to fill this 
information deficit through increased advertising of how the pension system functions 
and by supporting financial literacy programs for workers who are under-targeted by 
AFPs. Second, it appears that the licitation reform, through the creation of an auction 
mechanism where AFPs bid for new affiliates by offering the lowest commission, has 
successfully lowered the average commission. There are variations of proposals that 
would extend this reform to existing AFP affiliates who have been out of contact with 
their AFP for some time. For example, an affiliate would be sent multiple letters in the 
mail notifying them that they will be moved to the AFP that charges the lowest 
commission, unless they respond otherwise. Extending this reform in such a manner 
would be beneficial to Chileans. AFP Provida dominates the market in the poorest 
regions and in the lowest income levels, yet it has charged the highest commission for 
some years! The lack of financial knowledge of most Chileans has created significant 
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inertia which distorts the AFP market. Expanding licitation would result in poor Chileans 
immediately getting an (albeit small) income boost, and further drive down the average 
commission charged. In 2008 when licitation was enacted (it did not go into effect until 
2010), the average commission charged on contributions was 1.74%,64 and AFPs did not 
differ much on the commission they charged; collectively charging high commissions 
was in their mutual benefit. Now the average commission charged on contributions is 
1.15%, and there is greater variation in the commission each AFP charges. Post the 
creation of licitation, from 2009–2013, the national HHI in terms of affiliates fell from 
2,886 to 2,315—a significant reduction in four years. It has further fallen to 2,022. Over 
the past ten years, it seems that licitation has improved competition in the AFP more than 
any other reform or market forces acting alone. Expanding it should further increase 
market competitiveness. 
An area of this thesis that merits further investigation is to analyze the statistical 
significance of the differences in market concentration as measured by share of affiliates 
versus share of contributors, as well as the differences in market concentration between 
regions and between income tax brackets. Another idea for further research is to 
investigate the qualitative side of these data. By looking at these data, it is possible to 
make assumptions about the business practices of each AFP and about how different 
classes of customers might be treated by each AFP. For example, it appears that AFP 
Cuprum targets northern Chile and tacitly avoids low-income customers. It appears that 
AFP Capital is more egalitarian in the customers it pursues both regionally and by 
income tax bracket. And it appears that AFP Provida employs a business strategy that 
                                                
64 Mesa-Lago and Bertranou, p. 35 
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emphasizes a high quantity of affiliates, even poor affiliates that other AFPs avoid, 
regardless of the potentially low marginal revenue on each—but since AFP Provida 
consistently has charged the highest commissions and ranked at the bottom for overall 
quality of service, this is not in their favor. I would find it fascinating if a scholar in Chile 
collected survey data or investigated firsthand those judgements. 
 Before the AFP was created in 1981, the Chilean pension system was severely 
unequal in its structure. The different pension regimes were stratified by several factors, 
the most important of which was the ability of a class of people to petition and receive 
patronage from the government. One aspect of the AFP that has generally been hailed as 
positive by both its supporters and its detractors is its equality of regime. Piñera wrote 
that the purpose of the AFP was to promote, “freedom, and solidarity; a fair, yet efficient 
retirement system… a transcendental step that would benefit every Chilean, within the 
spirit of freedom, progress and justice”.65 Although the military still has a separate 
pension regime, all other Chileans, regardless of class, education level, industry, or other 
factors, are theoretically subject to the same rules and the same regime. Nevertheless, my 
research indicates that this supposed equality is not present as touted. As stated 
previously, there is a dearth of scholarly research on market competition in the AFP. This 
has led to the issue of its innate inequality of opportunity not being addressed. The AFP’s 
structure theoretically does not make it stratified, but the AFP is stratified in its 
implementation. The data indicate that workers in lower income tax brackets in south-
central Chile do not receive the same treatment or have the same opportunities as workers 
in upper income tax brackets in Santiago. This is not the realization of a robust, 
                                                
65 Edwards, p. 39 
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competitive, free market that Chile’s economic leaders envisioned when they first 
proposed the AFP in 1980. While the systemic advantages in the pension system that 
white-collar workers, government bureaucrats, and polo players might have over my nana 
are no longer as acute, they are still present.  
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